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ABSTRACTS 
 
The aim of this paper is to test new indicators about integration. The more 
integrated people are, the more the relations they have with the State will be 
normal. These relations can be a sign of normalization in the new society. Legal 
Residents have very accurate data. Amnesties are rather the same. On the 
other side, Census and Padrón are voluntary. People do not equally trust the 
State. A greater trust in the State matches with greater success rates in the 
regularization processes, for people carrying out voluntary registration. The 
more immigrants relate voluntarily with the State, the more possibilities will they 
have of getting residence permits. 
 
Questo paper vuol testare nuovi indicatori circa l’integrazione. A maggior 
integrazione della gente, tanto più normali saranno loro relazioni con lo Stato. 
Queste relazioni possono essere segno di normalizzazione nella nuova società. 
I residenti legali hanno dati molto precisi. Si dica lo stesso dell’amnistie. Il censo 
e il Padrón sono volontari. La gente non crede ugualmente nello Stato. A 
maggior fiducia nello Stato, maggiore saggi d’esito nei processi di regolazione 
per chi esegue registrazione voluntaria. Quanto più gli immigranti si relazioni 
voluntariamente con lo Stato, tanto più possibilità avranno di conseguire 
autorizzazione di residenza. 
 
L’objective de ce travail est de tester des indicateurs nouveaux pour 
l’intégration. Dans la mesure que les personnes maintiennent des relations 
normalisées avec l’État, elles sont plus intégrées. Ces relations peuvent être le 
signe d’une normalisation dans la société d’accueille. Les résidents étrangers 
avec carte de séjour sont bien enregistrés ; aussi bien que les personnes que 
demandent des Amnisties. Par contre, le recensement et le Padrón, en étant 
volontaires, n’ont pas des données si faibles. Les étrangers n’ont pas confiance 
dans l’État aussi bien les uns que les autres. Si les personnes ont plus de 
confiance dans l’État, la possibilité d´^être régularisée est plus grande. Si les 
étrangers font des registres volontaires, ils auront plus de possibilités d’obtenir 
la carte de séjour. 
 
 
TEXT 
 The Minister of Work and Social Affairs of Spain has its own definition of 
integration. In its webpages (http://www.mtas.es/migraciones/default.htm and 
http://extranjeros.mtas.es/), the Secretary of Immigration and Emigration 
proposes:  
“A process whose aim is to achieve gradual incorporation and share of legal 
resident immigrants in our country’s social and economical life in an 
environment of respect and mutual participation.”1 
 
 As L. Recolons has recognised [Recolons, 200x], we have evolved from 
a social dimension where integration was the characteristic of a group to an 
individual dimension where each individual may or may not be integrated.  
 There are several aspects about the Minister of Spain’s definition that we 
must consider. Firstly, it is a process, so it needs a period of time to conclude. 
Perhaps, it will be completed in the future. We can consider it opened and 
unfinished. Secondly, under the Minister’s point of view, participation is one of 
the indicators of people’s integration. The country’s social and economic life is 
mentioned as the measure of the process of participation. Thirdly, the proposal 
is to take under consideration only people with permits. In consequence, people 
without it cannot be “integrated”. Finally, mutual respect is mentioned, as is 
participation for a second time. 
 I agree with the notion of participation because people who have come to 
the country want to have access to education for their children in the new 
society, to the public health system for all the family and, obviously, to 
residence and working permits. In my opinion, it is not necessary to be “legal” to 
begin a long process of adaptation, more than integration. Residents with 
permits are only a part of the total of foreigners living in Spain. In countries 
where a lot of people are outside the “legal System”, saying that only legal 
residents can be integrated equals to leaving apart a large group of people2. In 
Spain, there’s no restriction for foreign people in order to register, so they can 
have a sanitary card and educate their children in public school. In 
consequence, if we consider that people who are attended by the public health 
system and have their children in public schools have begun the process of 
integration, there is obviously no need of any legal permit. It is possible that the 
process of integration begins regardless of permits because there are many 
sorts of public and administrative relations that foreign people may establish 
with the Spanish government, even if they are not “legal residents”. 
 But, this does not mean that all the people have the same opportunities 
to actually register in the Padrón (the Population Register of any municipality in 
Spain). Registration implies having a home and not everybody can have it. 
Generally, families have a home to live in. But those who work in the agriculture 
and live outside villages do not necessarily have it. That makes a great 
difference between nationalities just because they are working in different 
economical sectors. Africans tend to work in the agriculture while Americans 
work in the tertiary sector. So, many African people have temporary 
employments in the countryside, while American people rather live in the cities.  
 My point of view is that integration begins when people arrive in the 
country and become residents, not when they get permits. With the current 
Regularization Process (2005), a big number of people who have been living for 
many years with their family in the countryside will have the first opportunity to 
                                                 
1 “Proceso dirigido a conseguir la gradual incorporación y participación de los inmigrantes con residencia 
legal en España en la vida social y económica de nuestro país en un clima de respeto y participación 
recíproca”. 
2 Foreign “legal residents” were 1,982 million in 31/12/2004. One day after, Foreign People in the 
Municipal Registration (Padrón) were 3,731 million; 88% more!!! (www.ine.es, official data) 6-02-06 
obtain permits. During the long period they have been living in the countryside, 
they have used the public health system, and their children have been attending 
to public schools. For me, the process of integration didn’t stop just because 
they had no permits. Permits are only a step, a very important one, which will 
allow them to stay in the country and pay taxes, and, in consequence, to have 
more rights than they had before. 
The aim of this paper is to test new indicators about integration. In 
previous works, I have put forward the idea that administrative relations 
between people and the State can be regular, easy and voluntary [Sarrible, 
2002b]. The more integrated people are, the more the relations they have with 
the State will be normal. In other words, these relations can be a sign of 
normalization in the new society: more relations mean a major belief in the 
State, and a major trust in civil and political institutions.  
 
ABOUT DATA 
 There are a lot of data about Foreign People and the State. For instance, 
about Health and Security System, Work, Taxes or Education. “Foreign people” 
is just a category of the whole society. Yet, there is a great difference in 
opposition to Spaniards because foreign people may be “legal” or not. We can 
consider that there are two kinds of registrations. Compulsory, which can only 
be carried out by people with permits, and voluntary, which might be carried out 
by anyone staying in the country, even if they have no permits or their situation 
is not regular. 
 The Home Office has a “List of Legal Residents”: foreign people with 
permits, that is to say, with a right to stay in the country. Citizens from other 
European Union countries do not need permits, but they are included as well in 
the whole (under a special category) because they are not Spanish. On the 
other hand, there is the Padrón: a urban Register for all the people that have a 
home. That requirement means that people in the country working in the 
agricultural sector or in the primary sector who do not have an address cannot 
be included therein. Even if all the people have the right to do so, it does not 
mean that all foreign people would be in the list as well. During this 
Regularization Process many people avowed that they did not register because 
they did not know they could, or because, being not legal, they did not trust 
authorities. 
I do not consider the Padrón a good tool for estimating the number of 
foreign people living in Spain, because there are normal differences in the 
attitudes and behaviours among people with different origins. Some people tend 
to register, while other people do not do it in the same proportion. In 
consequence, we cannot consider that the total number of foreign people in the 
Padrón is really the number of all foreign people living in Spain, but the 
minimum number. Perhaps, differences between total figures and Legal 
Residents might be an estimation of the minimum quantity of “illegal foreign 
people residing in Spain”, which means people without permits. If people 
register accordingly to the information received through the social network of 
their community of origin, they do not do it in the same extent. Previous works 
have proved that most Americans register, but many Asians and Africans do not 
[Sarrible, 2005a, Sarrible, 2005b and Sarrible & Mustafá, 2004]. 
Other data that can be brought to consideration are Census and 
Amnesties. The first one is a voluntary survey that took place trough all the 
country in November the 1st, 2001, thus in a very special moment: right after the 
first Amnesty and before the second. Amnesties took place in 2000 and 2001 to 
allow the regularisation of all the people without permits in these years. Data on 
Amnesties are important because they allow us to compare the quantity of 
immigrants that presented the documents with the quantity of them who actually 
obtained the permits. Nevertheless, we suppose that people obtained permits if 
all the requirements were fulfilled. In this case, Amnesties are not considered 
voluntary, because people do need permits, so they are obligated to ask for it. It 
is the same situation Legal Residents have, for they must take documents to 
the Police Department to have permits. Some of this data and indicators have 
been used in previous works to make comparisons between communities of 
origins [Sarrible, 2002b, 2004b, 2005a] 
Data published by the Government include only foreign people living in 
Spain, and it is not necessary to have permits to register. Legal Residents have 
very accurate data because they must show documents to obtain permits. 
Amnesties are rather the same, because those who want to have permits must 
present all documents required to prove that they are under the condition for 
obtaining permits. On the other side, Census and Padrón are voluntary. People 
need not being “legal”, but they must be living in a home, have an address of 
their own and can be registered either in the Survey or in the Municipality 
Register. In exchange, they are allowed to have access to public education for 
their children and to the Health System. When a process of regularisation 
comes, they will have the documents proving they were already residing in the 
country for a period of time before it. 
 
 
ADMINISTRATIVE INDICATORS ABOUT FOREIGN PEOPLE 
 
 In a previous work [Sarrible, 2002b], we have proved that, in the city of 
Barcelona, the relations vary between the different communities of origins and 
the State, NGOs and other institutions. Americans have a tendency to declare, 
to show documents, to trust the people who receive them. On the other side, 
people coming from Asia or Africa rarely show their origin or their identification 
documents and try to mask their identity. These are two categories: the first one 
will have facilities in a process of regularisation, and the second one will rather 
have difficulties. 
 It may be that, because of these initial relations, future is conditioned. 
The more one trusts the State, the more documents he will get to prove his 
residence, and the more easily he can have permits. The less one believes in 
people or administration, the fewer opportunities to prove that he has been here 
for a period of time, and the less probabilities has in order to obtain the permits 
in any regularisation process. This vicious circle had an end in the last process 
of 2005 because, from that moment on, the information is equal for all the 
people. From that moment on, immigrants can understand the importance of 
administrative registration even if they have no permits, or, in other words, even 
if they are not “legal residents”. 
 The indicators set forth here are important because they are different 
from the common ones. Some of them have been used in previous researches 
though, perhaps, they will not be useful in the future. In the last, ongoing 
process of regularisation on 2005, it was made clear for everybody who wanted 
to become “legal” that inscription in the Padrón or any other official register is a 
must for obtaining residence permits.  If the information varied from one 
community networks to others, currently there is a common basis about the 
Administration and the basic relation with the Spanish State. 
 The aim of this paper is to show different data and indicators about the 
relations between foreign people and the Spanish State due to community of 
origin. First of all, the probability to obtain permits in the Regularisation 
Processes in 2000 and 20013 will be analysed. In the second part, comparisons 
between compulsory and voluntary registration are shown, i.e. between the List 
of Residents and the Padrón. In the third part, new estimations considering List 
of Residents, people asking for amnesties and new arrivals allow a comparison 
with other indicators. The proposal is to show the coincidences between 
attitudes towards voluntary Registration, facilities to obtain permits or to be 
regular after a process of Amnesty and quantities of new arrivals. On the other 
side, there is the people who have more difficulties, that are less admitted; 
perhaps because their relations with the State where not so natural. We cannot 
estimate the quantity of irregular people not appearing in any registration but, 
supposedly, they are not many and, in the moment, they tend to disappear. 
 The fact that there are a lot of people without permits does not mean that 
there are more difficulties to obtain it. In the Latino American case, massive 
arrivals  have taken place these years, voluntary inscriptions were a common 
behaviour and, maybe in consequence, more people have obtained permits in 
the process of 2000 and 2001 and probably in the one which is going on now in 
2005. There is not an inverse relation between quantity of persons without 
permits and the probability to obtain one. Probably, it depends on others 
factors, such as the normal administrative relations described here. 
 
1. AMNESTIES: admitted and refused 
 
 The periodicity with which processes of regularization have been carried 
on in Spain points only to a huge necessity of digging up the people who live 
marginal to the administration but who, otherwise, work and live in the country. 
In an article published on the 8th of October, 2005, the Minister of Work and 
Social Affairs of the former PP government, Manuel Pimentel, acknowledged 
that it is a selfish attitude to regularize permanently the immigrants who are in 
the country and got in without permission, because that blocks the possibility of 
giving legal permits and entries to the people who ask for them in the Spanish 
Consulates, which would be the logical way of regularizing immigration. 
 If there are too many “irregular” people, regularization processes are 
organized frequently. As a consequence, people who are already working get 
permits. Therefore, people who ask for them in the consulates cannot obtain 
one because there is an insufficient number of permits and country shares run 
out with each new process. This is what we know as “the perverse effect of 
social order”, a distortion in social laws, which end up sheltering or easing the 
same situations they were intended to avoid [Boudon, 1977]. 
 Gualda Caballero and Ruiz García [2004] have proved the increase in 
origin’s contracts from 2000 to 2004 in the South of Spain, so now there are no 
                                                 
3 In a Conference in the University of Joao Pessoa (Brazil, 2004), the comparison between Latino American and other 
foreign people was presented and discussed in a Master Program. The indicators about Continents of origins have been 
used in this presentation but the ones about countries are new. 
more working places for unemployed people in the area. An accurate profile in 
the country of origin is searched for. Feminine manpower grows and it changes 
origins (from south to north, from Africa to Northern Europe). That means 
increased unemployment among people already living in the country, or the loss 
of the working permit, being unable to find a work place. 
  That’s the reason why in the last ongoing regularization process (2005)  
people are required to have a work place in order to get the residence permit, a 
requirement which was not to be fulfilled in the processes of 2000 and 2001. 
Sadly, the truth is that there are always a lot of people living in the country 
without permits. After the previous processes are over, there are still people 
outside the system, who do not meet the constraints and hope to do so in the 
next occasion. All this means a never-ending spiral of people who remain at the 
margin of the system, and who cannot be eradicated by the processes. 
 
AMNESTIES 2000. According to the Annual of Migrations of 2002, this is 
the fourth regularization process which takes place in Spain, following the ones 
of 1985, 1991 and 1996. It was an insufficient process that had to have a 
continuation the next year with another one, called “rooting” process. They are 
in fact two different amnesties. Processes are not the same nor do they concern 
the same people. In both cases previous stay in the country was a must, without 
a need for justifying income with a working contract. In the case of the first 
regularization (2000), the period of stay should get to June the 1st, 1999. In 
2001, the requirement was to “have been in Spain since before the 23rd 
January, 2001, and prove the rooting situation (family, work market)”(Annual of 
Migrations, 2002). 
 In the Table 1, the success rate relating the permits given over the total 
of permits demanded is calculated and shown, classified in continents and 
significant countries of each region. Both the regularization process of 2000 and 
the rooting process of 2001 have a similar average success rate: 66’13 % in the 
first case and 63’61 in the second, which means that two demands out of each 
three were accepted. While in the 2000 process the success rate in the different 
countries is pretty regular, in the 2001 process there are larger differences. 
CONTINENTS. In 2000, America, in the first place, Oceania and Europe 
are over the average. Asia is slightly over the average and Africa slightly under 
it. Further below the average are the stateless and unknown (only 16’42% 
success rate), who obtained only one permit out of each six demands 
approximately. Continent by continent the averages are similar, generally, 
though that is not the case with the rates of some countries, where the 
differences are widely revealed. 
However, in 2001 differences between continents were also remarkable. 
Over the average we still find the same continents, though a lot closer one to 
each other: in order, Europe, America and Oceania. Africa does not get half the 
demands requested and Asia gets a few more than the quarter part. Stateless 
and unknown petitions have a success rate under the average and, but, higher 
than Asian and African’s. This could mean that the expectations built up by the 
new amnesty were higher than the actual possibility of getting a permit, at least 
for part of the population.  
 
 
 
Table 1 
YEAR 2000 REGULARIZATION PROCESS and YEAR 2001 
ROOTING PROCESS (AMNESTIES) 
by CONTINENTS and some COUNTRIES: given/demanded 
success rate 
AMNESTIES 2000 2001 
CONTINENT/Country % % 
   
AMÉRICA 85,11 73,94 
Argentina 85,36 77,56 
Brazil 82,01 72,01 
Colombia 83,37 75,77 
Ecuador 86,88 78,11 
Peru 83,34 73,44 
   
ASIA 67,77 26,06 
Bangla Desh 43,13 11,34 
China 72,46 45,32 
India 58,35 12,54 
Pakistan 63,63 9,41 
   
AFRICA 66,06 45,69 
Algeria 77,27 30,89 
Egypt 47,42 27,62 
Morocco 68,51 53,96 
Nigeria 56,28 42,63 
Senegal 53,41 21,16 
   
EUROPE 71,67 74,87 
Bulgaria 72,96 76,07 
Poland 81,51 67,81 
Rumania 70,76 76,86 
Ukraine 70,99 74,79 
   
OCEANÍA 83,58 72,97 
stateless/Unknown 16,42 57,84 
   
TOTAL 66,17 63,61 
   
SOURCE: Annual of Migrations 2002, on-line browse 
   
 
It seems the two more successful continents are coincident in both cases 
and, furthermore, show the same norm in another research: if the declarations 
to the administration are complete and exhaustive, later on the possibilities of 
obtaining a permit will be higher [Sarrible, 2002b, 2004a and b]. If we estimate 
that the success depends on reliable information (regarding the relations with 
the State administration), we can consider the information flowing through 
American, European and Oceanian networks is more realistic and allow the 
creation of more accurate expectations. Plus, the amount of demands carried 
out does not depend solely on the amount of non-legal people residing in the 
country. In those moments, the number of people coming from America, and 
who had registered in the Padrón, was considerably higher than the number of 
people from other continents. America gets a high success rate, but goes on 
having a lot of people without permits, at all times.4   
COUNTRIES.  In 2000, America is characterized by the proximity in the 
success rates of the countries presenting a higher number of requests in the 
process. There are no major differences between them. Something similar 
happens in Europe, but Poland, with over an eight accepted petitions out of 
each ten, surpasses the rest of the countries. On the other hand, the differences 
inside the other two continents are enormous. In Asia, there’s a big variation 
between the cases of Bangla Desh (four accepted petitions out of ten) and 
China (more than seven out of each ten). In Africa, we find a similar situation: 
Egypt gets almost five of each ten requests, while Algeria gets almost eight. 
Nigeria and Senegal both are over the average. 
In 2001, the differences are bigger both in continent averages and 
among countries. We could say that the process constituted a new hope for all 
those who could not make their request in the previous one, or those who were 
denied the permit. Whereas in the first process 247,098 requests where carried 
out, in the second the number went up to 351,269. Even though in both 
occasions the acceptation is similar, about two out of each three requests were 
accepted, in the second process over 100,000 more people were out of it who, 
assumedly, live in Spain. That is what the frequency of the processes in Spain 
and their proximity in time show: a high number of people with no permits 
residing in the country. 
When three out of each four American’s demands were approved, almost 
all the countries which did so are close to that proportion. In the case of 
European’s, there is a slightly wider range, which never goes beyond a 
difference of ± 9%. Differently enough, Africa and Asia show remarkable 
disparities. Africa’s average rate is under the global average, and only Morocco 
is above it, while Senegal and Egypt are below 30% acceptance rate. In the 
case of Asia there’s a fluctuation between China, which does not get given half 
the requests made, and the rest of the countries, which do not even get to one 
accepted out of each ten requests carried out. Asia’s average rate is set to one 
out of each four. 
 The situation of the different continents presents a wide disparity in the 
amnesty of 2001. America, Europe and Oceania get given three out of each 
four petitions; Africa does not even reach a two out of four proportion, and Asia 
stays in just one. Should we wish to summarize the global results of both 
amnesties, we should say that both processes are complementary. Where the 
first one, 2000, was insufficient, the second, 2001, tries to rescue the people 
who were not admitted in the former. However, it is obvious that, even though in 
both processes two requests out of each three were accepted, broadly 
speaking, the disparities between continents are remarkable in the second one, 
but not in the first. America, Europe and Oceania obtain the higher success 
rates or, in other words, their demands generally meet the requirements. Asia 
and Africa are below the average in both processes, but in the second they do 
not even reach a 50% success rate. The expectations built up by the process 
were greater than the real possibilities of obtaining permits for some people, but 
not for others. 
 
                                                 
4 As a proof, Table 2 shows the rates calculated following these data. 
ESTIMATIONS ON “LEGAL” RESIDENTS AND RESIDENTS WITHOUT 
PERMITS 
 
 There is not an accurate and complete estimation on all the people 
(foreign or not) who live in a territory, nor can it be. Whereas the evaluation 
might be precise enough about the people with the nationality of the country 
they live in, it will not be so about foreigners, regardless of their legal condition 
(regular/irregular). 
 We can make more or less successful attempts to count immigrant 
collectives, following different criteria. In my opinion, the first criterion we must 
observe is that not all collectives have equal opportunities, nor do they share 
the same information, nor the same opinion about the State and its 
administrations [Sarrible, 2004]. First of all, if they have documents, they will be 
in the Residents list. Only people who have already taken the necessary steps 
to get a permit and, therefore, meet the requirements, may appear in that list. 
Second, information flowing in the different communities of origin conditions 
people’s attitude towards voluntary inscriptions. That has been proved in the 
case of the Census of 2001 [Sarrible, 2004], and we can observe considerable 
differences that match the success rates of the amnesties and other parameters 
which try to measure the relations between the different collectives and the 
administration, through secondary sources. 
 We lay down various estimations in order to being able to compare the 
foreign population with permits and the foreign population which get voluntary 
inscribed, that should add up to a larger number. In principle, if there is people 
without permits from every origin in different proportions, the amount of people 
from a given origin should always be greater than the amount of legal residents 
from that origin. The capability of inscribing in a free-for-all voluntary 
registration, with no need for permits and without discrimination, should allow us 
to add up the people with permits plus all those who do not have one. That is to 
say, theoretically, that the voluntary registrations should allow us to estimate the 
foreign populations living in the country according to the ratio of people who 
decide to get inscribed therein. 
 A first comparison between two registers is shown in Table 2, containing 
data coming from the Padrón (January the 1st of each year) and from the Legal 
Resident lists (December the 31st, previous year). The difference of one day 
obeys to nothing else but a statistical criterion. 5 An index has been calculated 
using the Padrón as numerator and Residents as denominator. If the index 
surpasses 100, we may suppose that immigrants without permits (“illegal 
immigration”) have registered, as well as all the immigrants with permits (“legal 
immigration”), who need not do it.  
In theory, the possibility of it being below 100 is to be unexpected. It 
implies two possibilities. The first one is that immigrants without permits do not 
exist. The other is that not every legal resident gets inscribed in the Padrón. The 
first supposition is not true. One can admit, therefore, that the number of 
registered immigrants is inferior to the people living in the country, because not 
even all residents with permits are inscribed in the Padrón. This estimation 
would not then be useful to calculate how many people are residing in the 
country in total, and much less how many of them do not have permits. On one 
                                                 
5 On EUROSTAT legal residents appear with date of January the 1st, not December de 31st, in order to 
unite them with the rest of European countries. The statistics are the same in the case of Spain. 
hand, an increase in the number of immigrants without permits in regard to 
those who do have one (shown by an index above 100 and rising), may be 
dependant on the increasing of illegal immigration in the period, which 
overtakes the regularization which took place in those same years. On the 
other, it still is a clear indicator of the will of relation with the state, for 
immigrants carry out a voluntary inscription, even when they are in an illegal 
situation. 
 
Table 2 
Indexes relating foreigners in two registers: Padrón/Residents  x 100 
YEAR TOTAL EUROPE AFRICA AMERICA ASIA OCEANIA  Stateless 
2000 115,3 121,6 107,5 124,1 85,2 124,8 59 
2001 152,9 154,3 114,4 221,1 99,2 170,7  
2002 177,8 175,8 131,5 252,4 104,3 194,5  
2003 201,2 197,7 142,6 282,3 126,9 205,6 62 
2004 184,2 185,7 133,9 237,9 121,1 188,6 56 
2005 186,3 198,5 140,8 219,1 134,2 204,8 80 
NOTE:  Padrón date 1-1-x+1/Legal residents date 31-12-x  
 
 Table 2 is the blatant evidence that people do not equally trust the State 
and that their attitude towards the administration and, in the case, towards the 
municipality register (Padrón), which is voluntary, differs from one continent of 
origin to another. It is also true that attitudes may change, as may do the 
information in their different networks. In the first two years, less people coming 
from Asia register than the total amount of residents with permit. In the rest of 
the continents, indexes increase, though with oscillations, as is the case of 
Africa. That may have different causes: the number of people without permits 
varies along time, the attitude towards administration changes, the number of 
regularized people in both amnesties (2000 and 2001) is smaller than the 
number of people who have come into the country and have no permit. Yet, we 
must reckon amnesties have allowed the incorporation in the following years, of 
previously resident individuals without permits. The quantity of people without 
permits is to be expected to decrease after a regularization process.6  
In the cases of America, Europe and Oceania the increase in the index is 
evident. For one thing, it is probable that the number of people without permits 
grows and, for another, that there exists information in the communities which 
considers advantageous the inscription in the municipality register (Padrón). 
Possibly, most people know there are benefits in voluntary inscription. People 
who do so live in homes of their own and familiar cores, which can be declared 
upon inscription. 7 
 About Stateless and people whose nationality is unknown, we only have 
data for four years. They are missing twice in the Padrón, even though there is 
a number of Residents. Much on the contrary, compared to other immigrants, 
these people tend to the so called “invisibility”, that is, they prefer not doing 
anything which is not compulsory, such as getting a permit. Not even when they 
                                                 
6The “Calling Effect” (consisting in the conclusion that regularization processes cause a greater arrival of 
immigrants) is not to be exposed nor discussed here, for that increase may obey to a group of not so easily 
settled factors.  
7 Fraud has even got to the point of declaring 60 people living in the same normal lodging. An 
information on the matter published in the newspaper Metro, 10th October, 2005, page 4: “In Barcelona 
there are hundreds of overpopulated flats” 
have got one, dare many of them inscribe in the municipality register. We must 
point out that they call themselves “stateless”, but that denomination, such as 
“refugee”, must be given and stated by the Spanish administration, and mostly 
that is not the case. 
In short, we could mention some points: 
- It is not possible to estimate the total quantity of foreign people who 
reside in Spain, even having both compulsory and voluntary 
registrations. 
- The numbers displayed in voluntary registrations, such as Padrón or 
Census, give a minimal idea of the total quantity of residents. 
- This attitude may vary depending on the origin (continent) and on time. 
- A greater trust in the state matches with greater success rates in the 
regularization processes, for people carrying out voluntary registration. 
 
ESTIMATIONS AND COMPARISONS BETWEEN DIFFERENT SOURCES 
 
 Given the fact that people coming from different continents do not 
register freely in the same proportions, it will be difficult to consider that 
voluntary registrations will contain the whole foreign population, documented or 
undocumented. Padrón and Census, which constitute the options of voluntary 
registration, would, logically, contain more population inscribed than the List of 
legal residents, beforehand. Nevertheless, we have already seen that this 
theoretical hypothesis may not be actually precise. Next, we will calculate two 
indicators to record, once more, the different attitudes of the immigrants in 
Spain in the light of their continent of origin. This is a synthesis proposal, which 
contains most of the sources we have been working with up to now. But we will 
not necessarily work with the same quantities we have formerly used to 
calculate other indicators. In the first place, an index will be calculated, as is 
shown in Table 3. In that case, we will set forth a comparison between Census 
(date November the 1st, 2001) and legal residents two months later. 
 In the second place, we will compare estimated populations by means of 
adding up the results of the processes which took part from January the 1st, 
2000 to January the 1st, 2002. That implies the process of assuming a basis 
population, legal residents the last day of the previous year (December the 31st, 
1999), adding all the people who requested an amnesty both in 2000 and 2001 
and, then, examine the results. If, during the period, immigrants without permits 
kept on entering the country, Padrón will have more people than the addition of 
legal residents and amnesty requesters. If it has less, it means that not even 
after having requested an amnesty do some immigrants want to register in the 
municipality. It is also significant about the amount of undocumented people 
currently arriving and residing in the country. Fluxes are never the same for all 
continents, and these last years it seems that it was greater from America, 
which can be detected by this mean. 8 
 The advantage of this easy addition is that it presumes that everyone 
who is requesting an amnesty is actually in the country, even though he or she 
does not register in the municipality. It allows, then, a close estimation of the 
people living in Spain, though not voluntary registered. The inconvenient lays in 
the fact that some people who requested the amnesty in 2000, may also do so 
                                                 
8. Ministry’s data referring to detected “illegal” immigration concerns only the people arrived via the sea, 
and, such, only from certain origins. 
in 2001. That is not a usual case, for when the second process began, the first 
one was still unconcluded, and people could not know the result of their 
requests. Broadly, it was a new chance for people who could not acquire the 
necessary documentation at time for the process of 2000.  
 
Table 3 
COMPARISONS between different sources on foreign populations by continent: 
1. Basis INDEX 100; Census November the 1st, 2001 and  Residents December the 31st, 2001  
2. ESTIMATION on foreign population living in SPAIN on January the 1st, 2002. 
CONTINENT 1. INDEX   2. ESTIMATION
EUROPE 127   166 
AFRICA 108   103 
AMERICA 207   206 
ASIA 80   78 
OCEANIA 142   164 
Stateless / Unknown 33    
TOTAL 140   139 
1. Foreign population who carried out the Census / Legal residents x 100 = INDEX 
2. Residents on December the 31st, 1999 + Amnesty requests in 2000 + in 2001+ newcomers = 
Padrón on January the 1st, 2002 
 
 
1. INDEX 
In this case, we will establish a comparison between “legal” residents on 
December the 31st, 2001 and Census two months earlier, on November the 1st, 
2001. As immigration from outside is positive, at the end of the year, there will 
be more people than two months before. That’s why, if an error must happen, it 
would be in a different direction than what indicators show. Being the Census a 
voluntary survey, those who register do not get direct or evident benefits. In this 
case, we have also chosen a basis rate of 100. If the result equaled 100, 
everybody inscribed in the Census would be a legal resident two months later. If 
it is superior, there would be more people freely registered and, therefore, 
without permits. If it is inferior, it means that not even having permits people is 
to register in the Census. 
Most people who register in the Census and have no permit come from 
America, where one out of each two people who do so is not in the Residents 
list at the end of the year. This is indicative not only of a desire of improving the 
relations with the State administration, but also of important non-regular fluxes 
from that continent. 
Just as happened before, Oceania and Europe also display high indexes: 
people without permit tend to fulfill the voluntary poll. In the case of Africa, 
hardly more people than those who have permits get inscribed in the Census. It 
is the same for the whole of Spain but, in the case of Catalonia, where African 
residents were majority in that date, the calculated index is lower, and just 
reaches 94. As for Asia, there are less people in the Census than in the 
Residents list at the end of 2001. The behavior of the Stateless and those 
whose nationality is unknown is the same as in previous occasions: they try to 
avoid registering. 
To summarize: if there are a 40% of residents without permit as the 
average in all Spain, they seem to concentrate in the three continents which get 
higher success rates in the Amnesties, America, Europe and Oceania. Africa 
either has no people without permits – a most improbable thing – or a part of its 
population does not register. It is evidence that not all Asians register. Padrón 
allows estimations on people without permits only in the cases of the first three 
continents, whose populations tend to register regardless of their situation, 
though not for Africa and Asia. 
 
2. ESTIMATION  
 
This calculation allows not only to forming an idea of the attitudes of 
people from different continents about administration concerning voluntary 
registration, but also of the sum of people arrived in that interval of two years 
and who, not having permits, have registered. On those who have arrived but 
not registered no estimation whatsoever can be done, with this sources. 
The most outstanding feature of the two indicators in Table 3 is their 
almost perfect match. In this case, when we added up all the amnesty requests, 
we wanted to bring under account all the population who presented them, not 
only those who got the acceptation. This is a way to count up as many residents 
as able, who, by other means, would remain unknown. That is to say, all those 
people who do not have permits, wish to get one but are not always ready to 
register. 
The second remarkable feature is that amnesty processes, even if in the 
supposition that they could grant permits to everybody who demanded one 
(which is not the case, for many people do not meet the requirements), would 
not be enough in order to regularize all the people already living in the country, 
because immigrants keep on permanently coming. If the amnesty had been 
solved favorably to everybody, in January the 1st, 2002 there would have been 
40% more people residing with a permit. 
On the other hand, people coming from Asia still do not register, even 
when they are taking the steps towards demanding an amnesty. That indicates 
the administrative relations with the State are reduced to the minimum: only 
those who are obligatory, including the requests for residence permits. It is a 
mistake to assume that there are no undocumented immigrants from this origin, 
for in all the amnesty processes, including the ongoing process of 2005, a 
noteworthy number of Asians have also made their requests. 
The case of Africa is below the minimum levels. The sum of people 
residing legally plus all the African amnesty requesters of 2000 and 2001 get 
close to the quantity shown in the Padrón on January the 1st, 2002. That does 
not mean the arrival of undocumented immigrants is inexistent, but rather that 
their number may be small, almost nothing, and that’s why the municipality 
registration does not allow accurate estimations on this continent. 
On the opposite edge, we can find the three continents that had the 
higher success rates in the amnesties and that, nevertheless, accumulate a 
bigger amount of people without permits. That means, in the first place, that 
there is a notable undocumented immigration arriving from those origins. In the 
second place, these people tend to register. Consequently, we can estimate at 
least a minimum amount of people without permits, an operation neither 
available for Asia nor for Africa.  
America’s case is extreme: it has the highest success rate in the 
amnesties while, at the same time, having the biggest share of people without 
permits in the Census as well as in the Padrón. This people, that appear to be 
entering Spain in big quantities these last years, tend to inscribe in all existent 
voluntary registers, and that fact allows us to have an approximate idea of those 
who do not have permits and live in the country.  
The indicators of Table 3 have served us to confirm two aspects already 
pointed out in the previous ones. Firstly, that almost all people who register 
come from three continents. Europe, America and Oceania get a better success 
rate when requesting amnesties, and, also, people from these origins are 
permanently arriving to Spain, so there is always a high population without 
permits. On the contrary, people who do not get registered do not allow 
adequate estimation on the sum of people without permits and people who have 
arrived in the last years, and do not have such a high success rate in the 
amnesty processes. Certainly, the lack of registration and the lack of permits 
are linked. 
To summarize, the more immigrants relate voluntarily with the State, the 
more possibilities will they have of getting residence permits. That is so 
because of the proving methods: if they get registered, they will be able later on 
to prove they have already been in the country for a period of time before. It is 
also related with the trust they put in these administrative relations: if they get 
registered, they show up, they are telling the State where they are living, so the 
State will be able to determine how many people without permits are residing in 
its ground. On the contrary, people who hide themselves and do not declare 
their stay will have later on increased difficulties in getting a permit, so they tend 
to remain further on at the margin of the State, to make themselves even “less 
visible” for the State and its administration. 
 
 
CONCLUSSION 
 We must innovate all the time in the construction of indicators of 
integration. Comparisons in Barcelona City with data from NGOs and other 
organizations have shown that foreign people from different origins (by 
continent) had different behaviors in the relation with Institutions [Sarrible, 2002 
b].  
Attitudes towards the registration on the city “Padrón” by continents of 
origins have changed with the last Regularization Processes. Even though we 
have established that there were different behaviors according to the 
communities of origin (by continents), this disparities will nowadays disappear 
because the shared information is equal for everybody. So, perhaps, most 
indicators used in this work will not be useful anymore in the near future. Others 
must be constructed or we will have to search for alternative ones in order to 
replace them. All demographic phenomena (such as births or marriages) can be 
indicators of family formations and, in the long term, of an intention of a long 
stay in the country. 
 We must go on and consider official data about education, health, and 
social assistance. The relations that communities of origin establish with the 
administration of the Spanish State are important to realize their participation in 
civil society. Demographic indicators can help us, for they can show voluntary 
situations or consequences of marriages and births, such as the education of 
new generations.   
 Integration is a long process, but it does not begin when foreign people 
have permits.  In my opinion, integration begins with people’s arrival in the 
country. Administrative relations with the State may depend on the previous 
experiences as a citizen in their country of origin. The process of integration in 
the new society might expend more o less time. It will be very different for 
people from different continents or countries. Trusting in the State can facilitate 
integration and administrative relations in the new society. 
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